Suspension of South Sudanese vice-president very likely to renew NSAG and SSPDF clashes

On 11 September, state-run South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) announced that First Vice-President of South Sudan Riek Machar and eight other senior members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) have been charged with murder, treason, terrorism and financing terrorist acts, and crimes against humanity. Machar was then suspended from the vice-presidency pending his trial. The eight individuals included General Gabriel Duop Lam, former deputy chief of staff of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF). The SPLM/A-IO figures have been detained since March for their alleged role in organising the ethnocultural Nuer White Army militia’s February and March attacks on Nasir, Upper Nile state.

Speaking to Janes on 15 September, a United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) spokesperson said UNMISS “reiterates that any judicial proceeding should adhere to international standards of fairness and transparency”.

The spokesperson added, “As security and political tensions continue to escalate, we call on the parties to work together to resolve political deadlocks, reduce violence, and recommit to the full implementation of the revitalised peace agreement… At this difficult time, it is more important than ever that the country’s leaders put the interests of their people first.”

Significance

Machar’s suspension creates similar political tensions that contributed to the outbreak of South Sudan’s 2013–18 civil war and increases South Sudan’s already very high internal instability risks. Machar had previously been dismissed from the vice-presidency after allegedly plotting a coup against President of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit in December 2013. He later returned to the role under the September 2018 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) and its 2020 revitalised version (R-ARCSS). Machar’s suspension comes after the SPLM/A-IO faction loyal to Machar formed a political-military alliance with the National Salvation Front (NAS) non-state armed group (NSAG) in September 2025 and as the White Army militia threatened to launch renewed attacks in Jonglei and Upper Nile states if Machar is not released.

NAS

Janes assesses that Machar’s removal from the vice-presidency very likely increases the risk of greater collaboration between the SPLM/A-IO and other South Sudanese NSAGs. This would likely counteract the negative impacts of factionalism on the SPLM/A-IO’s ability to expand attacks targeting the SSPDF. On 4 September, independently run Netherlands-based Radio Tamazuj, which focuses on South Sudan and which Janes assesses as B2 for reliability (usually reliable) and credibility (probably true), published a transcript of its interview with NAS chairman Thomas Cirillo Swaka. According to Cirillo, “After the government in Juba attacked SPLM/A-IO forces led by Dr. Riek Machar – targeting all their military camps and displacing them – the National Salvation Front (NAS) provided assistance to help our brothers safely reach their destinations… Following that, communication and consultations took place between SPLM/A-IO and NAS… We agreed on a military-political alliance.” The Machar loyalist faction co-ordinating with NAS is led by SPLM/A-IO Deputy Chairman Oyet Nathaniel. Cirillo said in the interview that NAS conducted joint operations with the SPLM/A-IO in Yei River County, Central Equatoria (date unspecified), and that discussions to unify “our efforts to achieve a second liberation of South Sudan” were ongoing.

This alliance likely counteracts the negative impact of SPLM/A-IO factionalism on the group’s capabilities. On 9 April, an interim SPLM/A-IO leadership team was formed led by national Minister for Peacebuilding Stephen Par Kuol. However, the 9 April meeting was boycotted by Machar loyalists undermining its legitimacy – an issue compounded by Par Kuol’s continued engagement with Kiir’s Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU).

For more information on SPLM/A-IO factionalism, please see South Sudan stability report, January—March 2025, South Sudan stability report, April—June 2025, and SPLM/A-IO's suspended participation in national security mechanisms very likely to fragment South Sudanese transitional government in short term.

If Machar loyalists’ capabilities to conduct armed attacks are weakened by factionalism, the support of NAS militants is likely to moderately reduce its impact. NAS is active in Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria states with South Sudan’s capital Juba located in Central Equatoria. Therefore, an NAS and SPLM/A-IO alliance will very likely increase the risk to Juba in the short term. On 15 September, Nathaniel issued an SPLM/A-IO press release calling “upon all its supporters, members in the political and military wings, the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan to report for national service in defence of the citizens and the country and use all means available to regain their country and sovereignty”.

On 3 September, unidentified assailants ambushed UNMISS peacekeepers on patrol between Tambura and Mapuse in Western Equatoria. According to a 4 September UNMISS statement, the group “seized a small cache of weapons and ammunition” but no injuries or fatalities were reported. Janes assesses that the group was from the SPLM/A-IO or NAS. Janes has moderate confidence in this assessment because the attack occurred in their area of operation.

White Army militia

The SSPDF is very likely to face threats on two fronts if political tensions continue escalating, increasing the risk of a return to civil war. The first front would include Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria from NAS and SPLM/A-IO. However, the SSPDF is very likely to face increased attacks from the ethnocultural Nuer White Army militia and SPLM/A-IO units loyal to Machar in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Open-source information on the organisation and capabilities of the White Army is limited, but previous attacks by the militia have shown that the group very likely relies on small arms and light weapons including rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Unverified video footage posted on social media platform X on 31 August showed ethnic Nuer spiritualist leader Prophet Makuach Tut with White Army militants displaying a range of weapons common in the region. Janes assessed that the weapons included a Desert Eagle .357 handgun, AK pattern rifles (likely of Chinese and Romanian origin), and several RPG-7 pattern anti-tank weapons including at least one Chinese Type 69.

Tut started a march of armed fighters from Ayod county, Jonglei state, in late August moving towards Upper Nile and threatening to attack the SSPDF in Malakal town if Machar (who is also an ethnic Nuer) was not released. On 6 September, Eye Radio, which Janes assesses as B2 for reliability and credibility, reported that White Army militants led by Tut arrived in Pigi county, Jonglei state, leading Pigi County Commissioner Suliman Deng Thon to call on the RTGoNU and SSPDF to intervene.

Outlook

Janes assesses that in the immediate (one to four weeks) to short term (four weeks to six months), the SPLM/A-IO and NAS alliance, and renewed threats from the White Army, are very likely to increase the frequency and intensity of clashes between NSAGs and the SSPDF in several parts of the country, including Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Western Equatoria.

This assessment is based on the rhetoric of the 15 September SPLM/A-IO statement signed by Nathaniel urging supporters and members to mobilise for national service as well as the formation of the SPLM/A-IO and NAS alliance in early September. UNMISS patrols are very likely to continue facing the risk of attack as NSAGs try to seize weapons to improve their capabilities if their intent to target the SSPDF strengthens. Janes assesses any escalation in violence will pose a very high risk to civilians including national and international aid workers present in the country and lead to significant internal displacement of civilian populations.

Source: https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/suspension-of-south-sudanese-vice-president-very-likely-to-renew-nsag-and-sspdf-clashes