Reconciliation and Identity In South Sudan (14)

A theoretical analysis of the church’s role in reconciliation processes and the challenges reconciliation efforts face in South Sudan.

In July 2011 South Sudan officially seceded from Sudan, and gained their independence.

As the empirical data seem to suggest; there is a perception that Dinka are favoured by the government, primarily because the President is Dinka. It is therefore perceived, as the Murle rebellion suggests, that Dinka hold a privileged position within the country as an extension of holding the presidency. In such a climate the presidency would perhaps find it difficult to be perceived as a representation of an entire nation, and rather be seen as the symbolic representation of which tribe is dominant in the country today. This becomes even more problematic as the seat of presidency in South Sudan holds considerable power over all branches of government, and has unilateral control over the government’s military. The more power the position has, the more power the tribe of the sitting president would be perceived to hold. In such a climate it could perhaps be argued that the position itself reinforces the influence of tribal identities rather than providing a unified nation with a figurehead. The presidency then becomes a destructive element in a negative-identity spiral, which we touched upon earlier in the chapter, increasing the tensions between the different tribes and a perception of the existence of favored policy across tribal and ethnic lines.The second practice outlined by Llewelyn and Philpott is that of recognizing and acknowledging the past and victims of criminal acts. (Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014, pp. 26- 27) In South Sudan the lines between perpetrator and victim are interchangeable. In Bor, Riek Machar ordered ethnic cleansing of Dinka. In Juba, Dinka elements of the tiger battalion took it upon themselves to ethnically cleanse the capital from Nuer. On the way to Ethiopia, Dinka recruits were killed drones by Nuer tribes, and throughout the war the different tribes found themselves both at war with Khartoum and each other.In Pibor,  the Murle found themselves at war and in conflict with the Dinka, the Nuer and the government’s forces. (Human Rights Watch, 2014) Not only that, but the recruitment and use of child-soldiers means that many perpetrators are themselves victims. While there is a widespread desire to know what happened to their loved ones among many South Sudanese, the vicious cycle of revenge killings that is present makes the situation chaotic and the line between victim and perpetrator almost impossible to distinguish. With the rule of law being absent from considerable areas of South Sudan, many victims have taken the law into their own hands, becoming perpetrators themselves in the process. Inter-community fighting has become so extensive in certain areas along the Upper-Nile that it is difficult to see what was sparked by the war between Salva and Riek, and what was sparked by other events between the different communities. Certainly the leadership has to take responsibility at some level, but who are the victims and who are the perpetrators is very much a question up for debate.While acknowledgement of each tribe’s suffering could perhaps alleviate some of the pent-up anger that many South Sudanese feel, the share scope and breadth of suffering that has been inflicted upon the country could further fracture the tribes. Especially considering the lack of solid justice institutions and security to protect civilians, and to ensure that transgressions are registered and documented when they happen.The third practice Llewelyn and Philpott mention is that of reparations (Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014, pp. 26-27) which can also be seen as rather problematic in the current South Sudanese context. With the lines between victim and perpetrator blurred to such an extent; who is deserving of reparations? Should the various tribes pay tribute and reparation for the damage they have done to each other, or should the government provide reparations to citizens who have been displaced by the war? Many citizens have lost their livelihoods, their farms and their herds because of the conflict. If all those displaced are given reparations the economic impact would be severe. Even if the issue of who should be given reparations were to be resolved, how would they go about finding the resources to provide this? South Sudan’s economy is shrinking rapidly, with economic forecasts of the situation to predict South Sudan to lose approximately $22.5 billion in a five year period, and those figures are deemed too positive by some analysts.Their main source of income, oil exports, has been dramatically reduced through the war, and with the fact that they have a fixed-price agreement with Sudan regarding oil transport that income is also vulnerable to market changes. It would appear, at least in part, that due to the vast amount of people directly affected by the war, the share scope of victims and perpetrators involved, reparations would be truly challenging.Even if you could somehow figure out who are to be given reparations, without purposefully or accidentally discriminating against anyone, the country’s economy would perceivably be unable to cope with a significant amount of reparations. (Frontier Economics, 2015).Already we are beginning to see how engaging in traditional approaches to reconciliation may prove challenging in the South Sudanese context. Many of the systems that these practices seemingly require are absent in the South Sudanese context, or severely underdeveloped.Simultaneously we can also see how reconciliation process could easily become chaotic given the very real lack of clear accountability, where the line between victim and perpetrator is diffuse and difficult to affirm. Not only that, but as we will see next accountability has become difficult to ascertain in the current situation.Fourth, is the practice of accountability (Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014, pp. 26-27) where I have to repeat the chaotic situation that South Sudan is in. It is plain to see from the data, the respondents and the reports released regarding the situation that the line between victim and perpetrator is difficult to judge appropriately. While it is clear that the country’s leadership - namely Salva Kiir and Riek Machar - have to be seen as at least somewhat if not entirely accountable for the chaotic situation South Sudan is in, there is a general perception that even if the two were to decide to end the war, there are forces behind them and around them that would not. The general perception among respondents, and recent reports surfacing regarding the situation, indicate that neither are in complete control of all military commanders, and that some are considered likely to continue to fight even if a peace-agreement that the two men decide to respect is in place. Yet it is clear that the perception of the people is that their leadership has failed them, and that they are the ones that need to apologies and make right what the country has become.The SSCC has been very clear in its condemnation to pin-point the personal conflict between Salva and Riek as the root cause, and wile our data indicates that the issue is seemingly rooted deeper than a political conflict, it is this perception that the people and the church operate from and have presented of the conflict. However, inter-community fighting has become so extensive in certain areas along the Upper-Nile that it is difficult to see what has been sparked by the war between Salva and Riek, and what has been sparked by other events between the different communities.It is also difficult to hold leaders with such influence accountable for transgressions, or even to have them admit to these transgressions. They are in positions of substantial power and as such can not be directly subjugated to stand accountable for their actions. In cases such as this, Louise Malinder points out that the use of amnesty deals are useful in holding individuals accountable and giving those guilty the chance to tell how, why and when things happened without the fear of criminal prosecution. It can be utilised to enable a process that could provide closure and acknowledgement to families who have lost their loved ones throughout the conflicts. In South Sudan however Riek and Salva do not represent soley themselves, but have become representatives of their tribes as exemplified by the statements made by troika diplomatic envoys. They exclaimed their frustration over the fact that Dinka would not settle without Salva, and Nuer would not settle without Riek, which could also be interpreted as signs of the war having taken on the dimension of two tribes jostling for power.What amnesty does provide is a possible way for Salva Kiir and Riek Machar to take responsibility for their role in the conflicts without risking severe legal ramifications.This could help lower the bar for when the two leaders would be willing to accept responsibility for the situation. As we see in the theoretical works of Van Ness regarding accountability; the act of taking responsibility and working to restore the trust of the population is an important step in restorative justice. To say “I’m sorry” without risking criminal persecution could provide a means for the leaders to begin to accept accountability and for the people to feel like their suffering and despair has been acknowledged. Yet as respondents have pointed out and numerous reports have stated; It is highly unlikely that either of the two will simply give in regardless of being offered an amnesty deal or not.The fifth and sixth practices for reconciliation as mentioned by Llewelyn and Philpott go together hand in hand, namely that of apology and forgiveness (Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014, pp. 26-27) As respondent three stated when describing how many South Sudanese felt; “They [Salva and Riek] need to say they are sorry”. (Resp3) The people, while frustrated and saddened by the current situation, are seemingly ready to forgive their leaders for their role in the current conflict. While both respondents and reports describe a people that feel betrayed and forgotten, the SSCC’s statements show a clear intent, desire and willingness to forgive Salva and Riek for their roles in the current situation.“Forgiveness seems foolish in the world of politics and militarism, but the Church of the Crucified Christ who, even as he was dying, said ‘Father, forgive them; the do not know what they are doing’ (Luke 23:34), forgiveness is the only way. […] To choose forgiveness and sacrifice is to choose greatness.” (South Sudan Council of Churches, 2015).What we end up seeing is that much of what is required for national reconciliation amongst the peoples of South Sudan is seemingly lacking. Respondents speak of a nonexistent infrastructure for transport, an absence of communication possibilities and a generally poorly built infrastructure. Various reports and SSCC statements speak of a severe lack of adequate justice institutions capable of handling the most basic of criminal-cases, with people fearing those charged with their protection. These institutions are unable to handle basic day to day criminal proceedings, let alone something as huge as safeguarding a reconciliation process - which can be painful under the best of circumstances and dangerous if not handled with care, sensitivity to just practices and adequate security measures. Reconciliation as outlined in these influential theoretical models may not be possible within the current South Sudanese context. Yet it is clear that the betterment of relations between the different peoples in South Sudan is necessary.Perhaps the South Sudanese example shows us that we need to rethink certain elements of reconciliation theory and adapt it to fit the context we are working within.We find support for this in the writings of reconciliation scholar Braithwaite. To engage in reconciliation through the use of non-truth, such as not bringing up violations the other has done against you and your own, is documented to be beneficial in bettering relations between peoples. In many instances, Braithwaite points out, non-truth has worked seemingly just as well as truth in reconciliation processes. (Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014, pp. 225-227) This discovery points to there being more to reconciliation and restorative justice practices than dealing with past atrocities directly.When you remove the truth element from reconciliation it could be argued to become a process that primarily works to improve relationships through interaction. It is with this as a point of departure that we can perhaps begin to see how reconciliation practices can be used to better relations for a different purpose, such as national-identity creation.When we combine Cecilia Clegg’s theory on identity renegotiation as key to reconciliation, and Braithwaite’s discovery that reconciliation processes without the truth element can still help improve relationships; we find that through creating better relationships with the other we renegotiate our own identity.As creating a national identity could be argued to revolve around finding a common identity, it could perhaps indicate that reconciliation approaches can help greatly in that effort as well. With that in mind we can perhaps use the different elements within the theories of reconciliation and restorative justice as a point of departure in helping lay the groundwork in creating a national identity. We will come back to the theoretical reasoning and arguments for this approach in section 6.6.