South Sudan: Addis Ababa - New Talks, Old Problems

Whilst many people remain hopeful that the peace talks currently underway in Addis Ababa will lead to a genuine resolution of the conflict in South Sudan, we need to understand that both Sudan and South Sudan are currently dealing with rebellions which came about as a result of a poorly managed peace accord (the Comprehensive Peace Agreement).

It is indeed ironic to see both countries in a sub-regional forum trying to address internal conflicts less than three years since they parted ways in a process considered by mediators and international actors as fair, final and comprehensive to the problems of the Sudans.

The irony is that the two states are facing very similar problems of constitution, governance, political space and militarism.

In Addis Ababa each of the Sudans will be independently addressing unfinished CPA business - both parties have previously worked tirelessly to delay solutions to these admittedly difficult problems until it was too late and issues materialised into fully blown violent conflicts returning each country to a pre-2005 CPA state.

Nevertheless, the resurgence of violence is not a surprise to observers of Sudanese politics, with many academics and political observers having forewarned the fragility of an exclusive process with a hastily conducted referendum that left many issues between and within the Sudans unresolved.

The new Republic of Sudan (North) was the first to become trapped in conflict, barely a month after the departure of South Sudan, with the rebellion in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. South Sudan actually averted any large implosions through its first year of independence until its slide into conflict last December.

With many blaming external actors (and each country's antagonistic neighbour) for conflicts, few have defined the crisis of the Sudans as a result of poor policy choices and priorities.

Within the CPA framework Sudan chose to split, rather than losing an Islamist hegemonic state, while South Sudanese elites chose a sub-regional role rather than addressing political aspirations within a broader and diverse Sudan.

Moreover, available CPA evaluation literature blamed Western actors - notably 'The Troika' (Norway, UK and US) or the IGAD partners' forum- in pushing for quick results.