Adrift in a sea of moral equivalence: US policy challenges in South Sudan

Sudanese refugees and ethnic South Sudanese families who have fled from the war in Sudan line up while waiting to board a truck to go to a Transit Centre for refugees, near Renk, South Sudan (AFP)

The United States faces tough choices in South Sudan as instability persists and regional ripple effects risk widening.

Among Western nations, the US played a leading role in South Sudan’s path to independence. Over several decades, Washington invested billions of dollars in aid, development and diplomatic initiatives. The US supported then-Southern Sudanese aspirations for self-determination, helped broker the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and recognised the new nation immediately after its 2011 secession, exerting decisive influence over South Sudan’s political landscape. This engagement reflects a mix of strategic and humanitarian interests that set Washington apart from other global powers.

US influence is increasingly challenged by regional and global actors. President Salva Kiir has systematically consolidated power by undermining key provisions of the September 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement, delaying security reforms and sidelining opposition leaders.

Uganda, under President Yoweri Museveni, provides crucial military and diplomatic backing that shields President Kiir from international accountability for human rights abuses, war crimes, corruption  and the perpetuation of conflict, significantly undermining US efforts to apply pressure or enforce reforms. Simultaneously, China dominates South Sudan’s primary source of revenue, oil, while Russia positions itself as an alternative security partner. Together, these strategic realignments have sidelined US interests in an increasingly multipolar landscape. If Washington retreats, it risks enabling dictatorship to thrive without accountability. Yet Washington’s leverage has declined in recent years, primarily due to South Sudan’s increasing dependence on Beijing for its oil exports. Any new strategy must therefore be realistic about the limits of American influence.

South Sudan’s instability has consequences beyond its borders, putting neighbouring countries, such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, at risk of refugee crises and potential militarisation in the East African region. Uganda’s unilateral backing of Kiir’s regime creates a regional environment that entrenches authoritarian rule and empowers those undermining peace. Museveni’s support for Kiir is primarily driven by his own economic interests and fear of Ugandan rebels, which complicate efforts to shift his position through pressure alone. Ugandan traders hold a near-monopoly over food and essential goods in Juba’s markets. It also undermines international peace frameworks and challenges the credibility of multilateral institutions in the region.

The East African region is increasingly becoming a flashpoint for conflicts, with far-reaching implications for neighbouring states. The war in Sudan, for example, carries serious consequences for South Sudan’s already fragile stability. Alliances between Sudan’s armed factions risk drawing Juba directly into the conflict. This could occur through historical and ethnic ties, cross-border militia networks and contested borderlands, where movements of fighters and weapons could easily spill over into South Sudanese territory.

The ongoing civil war in Sudan is primarily between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). However, other armed movements, including the Blue Nile–based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Gathering Forces (SLGF) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), have entered the conflict on the side of the RSF. Their involvement highlights the war’s widening front and the potential for prolonged instability across multiple regions. The SAF-led government in Khartoum has repeatedly accused South Sudan’s government of harbouring these rebel groups, a charge Juba has consistently denied. Whether substantiated or not, such accusations risk straining already fragile relations between Sudan and South Sudan and could complicate future mediation or regional peace efforts.

Any formal alignment of Sudanese belligerents with South Sudanese armed groups would not only destabilise border areas but could also pull South Sudan into a proxy conflict it cannot afford. Even in the absence of formal alliances, the weakly-secured frontier and entrenched patterns of cross-border mobilisation make escalation highly likely. Ultimately, South Sudan is not merely an observer; it is at risk of being drawn directly into the Sudanese war.

The humanitarian consequences are equally profound. Since April 2023, the renewed conflict in Sudan has forced hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees into South Sudan, particularly into already impoverished northern states. This sudden influx intensifies pressure on scarce food, water and healthcare resources, straining humanitarian agencies that are chronically underfunded. Disrupted trade routes from Sudan further limit the flow of essential goods into South Sudan, compounding food insecurity and deepening the economic crisis in border communities. Meanwhile, Sudan continues to host South Sudanese refugees who fled the country during the December 2013 civil war, a conflict that still casts long shadows today, highlighting the enduring cross-border humanitarian dimension of the region’s crises.

Perhaps most concerning, Sudan’s war could reignite internal divisions in South Sudan. If Sudanese factions arm or fund sympathetic leaders in Juba, or if the humanitarian burden overwhelms state capacity, the country’s fragile political balance may collapse. Rival elites could exploit the crisis along ethnic and regional lines and the continued flow of fighters and weapons across the border could spark renewed armed confrontations. In this sense, the Sudan conflict is not merely a neighbouring war but a destabilising force capable of dragging South Sudan back into full-scale civil war.

First, for the United States, the stakes are high. China’s economic dominance and Russia’s security engagement are securing footholds in East Africa, diminishing the strategic leverage the US once enjoyed.

Second, ongoing conflicts threaten regional stability, strain counter-terrorism partnerships and worsen humanitarian crises.

Third, a failure to respond decisively would signal that US investments can be disregarded, weakening Washington’s credibility.

It is crucial for Washington to address this matter decisively, rather than avoiding action. The US must also acknowledge openly that South Sudan’s democratic aspirations are being undermined by outside powers, most notably Uganda and, increasingly, China.

To protect its strategic interests and promote lasting peace, the United States must adopt a targeted approach focusing on accountability, balanced regional engagement and proactive multilateral coordination. Central to this strategy is recognising President Kiir as the primary obstacle to progress and holding him directly accountable, rather than diffusing responsibility across all actors. Multiple credible sources, including the United Nations Security Council, Human Rights Watch and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, identify Kiir as the main barrier to implementing South Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement. These reports highlight that delays in security reforms and Kiir’s consolidation of power have intentionally undermined the peace process. According to a Reuters report in March 2025, Kiir’s political manoeuvring and clashes prompted other leaders, including First Vice President Machar, to suspend participation in key aspects of the agreement; later that month, Kiir placed Machar under house arrest. While other South Sudanese leaders bear varying degrees of responsibility for ongoing challenges, attributing collective blame to all political or military figures would obscure the realities on the ground and hinder efforts toward a just resolution. Evidence at local, regional and international levels confirms that Kiir has deliberately obstructed the implementation of the peace agreement. Kiir undermined the peace process by systematically withholding funds from agencies tasked with monitoring and enforcing the agreement. He further violated its terms by unilaterally dismissing opposition leaders from constitutionally mandated posts without consulting their parties. He is also actively directing joint South Sudan–Uganda military operations in countries such as Akobo, Nasir, Fangak, Mayon, Longechuke and other areas he views as threats to his regime. Treating all leaders as equally responsible misrepresents the situation and undermines efforts to achieve a fair resolution.

Washington should also refine its regional strategy by reducing reliance on Uganda and cultivating stronger partnerships with Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan, thereby creating a counterbalance against unilateral interventions. Targeted embargoes, including asset freezes, travel bans and sanctions on those enabling authoritarian rule, should be deployed judiciously and, if necessary, applied to Ugandan military and security personnel. These measures would reinforce US credibility and encourage responsible behaviour among regional actors. However, past experiences show that sanctions can be less effective when China or Russia provides alternative support. This is one reason the US should be concerned about losing its influence in East Africa.

Finally, the United States must lead efforts to coordinate with multilateral institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, Troika countries (the United Kingdom, Norway, and the United States), the United Nations and the European Union. Through this coordination, Washington can shape peacekeeping mandates, enforce accountability and curb regional spoilers. Sustained support for civil society and independent monitoring is essential to ensure accountability and maintain momentum for long-term peace. Achieving lasting peace also means focusing on South Sudanese civil society, religious leaders and grassroots movements, because their strong local support is essential to challenge the narratives pushed by elites.

Nearly 12 years have passed since the civil war began, yet US policy on South Sudan amounted to tough rhetoric, with little action. Given these documented failures, one must ask: why does the United States persist in an overly cautious approach?

South Sudan remains a humanitarian and strategic concern. While the United States retains unique leverage through financial, diplomatic and regional channels, indecision risks ceding its influence to countries such as Uganda, China and Russia. Immediate and decisive action through targeted pressure, regional partnerships, multilateral leadership and local engagement is essential for the US to preserve its credibility and strengthen stability in East Africa. Washington must choose whether to shape South Sudan’s future or simply react to the agendas of others. Washington does not have to choose between full intervention and complete withdrawal. A balanced approach that strengthens a credible and impartial African-led peace process while providing targeted US support would be more effective. Remaining adrift in a sea of moral equivalence would be both an ethical and strategic mistake for the United States. It must act decisively to secure a stable and thriving future for the people of South Sudan.

Source: https://thearabweekly.com/adrift-sea-moral-equivalence-us-policy-challenges-south-sudan