South Sudan: Upper Nile Diary - Atrocities, Federalism and the Shilluk

analysis

Even in a war of rapidly fluctuating military fortunes, Malakal stands out: the capital of Upper Nile state changed hands six times between December and March. And even in a war characterised by massive atrocities, Malakal has been hit particularly hard: the number of civilians killed by both sides may never be known, but it is clear that patients were shot in their hospital beds, among numerous other human rights violations.

Malakal is now a shrunken shadow of its former self, a distressing sight for anyone who knew the town before. Market stalls are shuttered, where the doors haven't been bashed in, or burnt. Some abandoned residential areas, which bore the brunt of the fighting, are now over-run by foliage, the town returning to the bush; the UN estimating that 22% of it town was destroyed.

Now Malakal is populated mainly by soldiers, with large houses and NGO offices requisitioned for the war effort. Most civilians have fled. More than six months after the government regained control of the town, over 17,000 people still live in the grotesquely swollen UN base a 10 minute drive from the main urban area, coping as best they can with their temporary shelters, the lack of hygiene, and the reality of their newly reduced circumstances.

Some of the displaced cautiously make their way into town during the day, to sell goods in the market, or check on what is left of their houses. Most believe it is still too dangerous to leave the camp.

Those now living in muddy squalor in the UN base are, like the population of Upper Nile state itself, mainly Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk. Their interactions inside and outside the UN base mirror the shifting dynamics of politics in the state.

In the years before independence, there was considerable frustration in the Shilluk kingdom, which borders the White Nile around Malakal. Many complained that their land had been stolen by the Dinka, with the support of the 'Dinka-dominated' SPLA. Several Shilluk self-defence groups sprang up.

Tensions increased during the 2010 elections. South Sudan's major opposition leader, Lam Akol, is a Shilluk, and received considerable support from his home region, increasing the perception within the SPLM/A that the area and its people represented trouble. Shilluk politicians within the SPLM, including Pa'gan Amum, then the Secretary General of the party, lost popularity at home because of their apparent inability to help 'their' people in a time of need.

Armed resistance grew. In March 2011, in the run-up to independence, a Shilluk militia leader, Johnson Olony, attacked Malakal town. He eventually joined the South Sudan Democratic Movemement/Army (SSDM/A), a loose coalition of rebel groups backed by Khartoum, and became its leader after the death of George Athor. However, in June 2013, Olony accepted a presidential amnesty, reportedly after receiving an ultimatum from the Shilluk king.

Six months later, South Sudan slid into civil war. As thousands of SPLA soldiers (predominantly Nuer) defected to him, Riek Machar could have been forgiven for hoping for significant reinforcements from among the Shilluk. They, too, had many grievances with President Salva Kiir's government. If sizable Shilluk forces, perhaps led by Olony, had turned on the government, Machar's chances of hanging on to Malakal, and over-running the Paloich oilfields to the north, would have increased considerably. This did not happen.

Shilluk chiefs, elders and others told me that things could have been very different if Machar's forces had stopped their bloody march at Malakal in the early days of the war. Instead, the rebels attacked several Shilluk villages, on both banks of the White Nile.