South Sudan: Cutting Corners to Peace

analysis

On 26 August 2014, the two parties to the South Sudan conflict - the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM in Opposition) - reached their fourth agreement aimed at ending the violence that broke out in mid-December 2013.

The latest accord mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is called the Implementation Matrix of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, and gives the two parties 45 days to form a unity government.

It follows three previous agreements: the January 2014 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Status of Detainees; the May 2014 Agreement on the Recommitment on Humanitarian Matters of the Cessation of Hostilities; and the June 2014 commitment to the formation of a transitional government of national unity, which was intended to have happened within 60 days.

Most of these agreements had been violated within hours after being announced. It is therefore important to consider what options IGAD would have if the latest agreement were also not adhered to. At a more fundamental level, it must also be asked whether the IGAD-led mediation process does, in fact, offer a viable approach to dealing with the root causes of the South Sudan violence.

After the signing of the latest agreement at IGAD's 27th Extraordinary Summit, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn threatened punitive action against any party that violates the agreement. 'As a region, we have to show any party which violates agreements that there are consequences to misbehaviour,' he said.

While IGAD has not elaborated on specific actions it might take, it has been suggested that the body should consider personal sanctions against the South Sudanese leaders, given that most of them have families, property and bank accounts in the IGAD member states. Whether or not such an approach would be practical or effective is, however, unclear, considering the significant investments that most of the IGAD member states have in South Sudan.

While the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have imposed travel sanctions and asset freezes on the commander of President Salva Kiir's presidential guard, General Marial Chanuong, and a senior rebel commander, General Peter Gadet Yaak, these have done little to change the dynamics of the conflict.

It is more likely that neither of these parties (the US and EU) nor IGAD will be keen to follow through on more punitive measures given doubts over their efficacy, and the possibility that it might hurt the sanctioning countries' economic interests.

Indeed, there is the viewpoint that some of IGAD's members are motivated by bilateral interests in the outcome of the peace process, and that they have, as a result, taken partisan positions in the process.

The presence of Uganda's military troops and North Sudanese rebels groups in parts of South Sudan are seen as examples where IGAD has allowed actors within its region to further polarise the situation and complicate the mediation process.

The mediation process has also raised questions about IGAD's viability in promoting lasting peace in South Sudan. It is one of the few regional bodies that have set up a mediation support unit since 2012, and has done well in shouldering the responsibility of promoting a peace framework for South Sudan. Yet there are those who think that IGAD is simply looking for a quick fix aimed at containing the violence, rather than establishing a workable framework that could truly promote lasting peace.