South Sudan: new country, same old mistakes?

False dawn … South Sudan's independence was greeted with jubilation, but its leaders may be repeating the mistakes of the past. Photograph: Spencer Platt/Getty

Towards the end of a rainy-season afternoon in September 2012, just over a year after South Sudan^[1]'s independence celebrations, four boys pushed a wheelbarrow down the main street in Leer^[2], a small town in Unity state.

The sky above their heads was a mix of cobalt and slate grey, and along the length of the street pedestrians started to walk a little faster, aware that the clouds might burst at any minute. Several weeks of rain had turned the dirt road into an almost impassable mix of puddles and cloying mud.

The very few people in Leer who owned vehicles were mainly keeping them at home, because driving was arduous and petrol too expensive. The boys struggled on with their heavy wheelbarrow, weighed down with bright yellow jerry cans of water; they were the only traffic on the road. As they made their way home, they loudly imitated the low thrum of an engine, transforming the wheelbarrow into the car of their dreams.

Gatgong Jiech, a Nuer^[3] pastoralist, lives a 20-minute walk away, past the airport which is used by NGOs to transport goods and their staff. He says almost all the buildings in town were destroyed during the 1983-2005 north-south civil war. The fighting obliterated what little infrastructure there was in South Sudan, and made development all but impossible.

Sitting outside his luak, or cow barn, with his sorghum crop peeking over the fence, Gatgong is frustrated that there has been little improvement since the South Sudanese took control of their destiny. Gatgong still farms with a hoe, though he would love to use modern equipment. When people are really struggling, NGOs hand out food, he says, but "the government gives us nothing". However, he is glad that he has been able to send his children to school, an opportunity he never had.

***

The South Sudanese leaders inherited an awful situation, and have certainly brought about some positive change. Unfortunately, there are signs that they are repeating some of the errors made by the Sudanese leaders against whom they fought so fiercely.

Just as the bulk of Sudan's resources were concentrated in and around Khartoum, Juba has developed at a rapid pace. In itself, Juba's growth is no bad thing. "It is beautiful to see!" says Bishop Paride Taban^[4]. There has been some growth in the state capitals, too, albeit from a very low base. However, as in the Sudanese model, South Sudan's 10 states are almost entirely dependent on Juba.

The 2011 budget of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state^[5], for example, was just over 150m SSP, slightly over $30m, at the illegal market rate of the time. Well over 90% of this money came from Juba. The total was clearly insufficient to develop the state, which has a population of more than a million people. This situation is repeated all over South Sudan.

The weakness of the governments in South Sudan's states is structural, and replicates that of the federal government: just as the latter's revenue comes almost entirely from oil, the states' come from a transfer of funds from Juba. In any given state capital, the state government tends to hold tight to the money it receives, leaving the other areas under its control with next to nothing.

Peter Nyok, senior administrator in Leer, did not receive the funds he needed to develop his area. Political favour plays a role, too: Leer voted heavily against Taban Deng, the Unity state governor, in the disputed 2010 elections, so until he was sacked in 2013 it was less likely to receive substantial support than other areas of the state.

When John Garang^[6] signed the comprehensive peace agreement^[7] in 2005, ending the civil war, he made a firm commitment to developing rural South Sudan. Some 83% of the population live in rural areas, and on average they are much worse off than those in the cities. "The SPLM vision, policy and slogan shall be to take the towns to people in the countryside rather than people to towns, where they end up in slums," Garang said^[8] (pdf).

Sure enough, "taking the towns to the people^[9]" became one of the great slogans, repeated by everyone from President Salva Kiir down; but although it was enshrined in policy documents, it did not seem to bring any change on the ground. Local government institutions were set up, but they did not provide many services.

In that same speech, Garang promised that the government would construct "windmills all over rural Sudan to provide clean drinking water and build micro-dams for generating small scale hydro-electric power for rural towns". Neither has happened: instead, money and resources have been concentrated (and squandered^[10]) in the national capital and, to a much lesser extent, the state capitals.

• From A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts by James Copnall. The book is available in stores from Wednesday and e-bookshops from Friday^[11]

References

1. ^{^} More from the Guardian on South Sudan (www.theguardian.com)
2. ^{^} Leer (en.wikipedia.org)
3. ^{^} Nuer (www.gurtong.net)
4. ^{^} Bishop Paride Taban (www.unicef.org)
5. ^{^} Northern Bahr el Ghazal state (www.gurtong.net)
6. ^{^} John Garang (www.theguardian.com)
7. ^{^} comprehensive peace agreement (www.usip.org)
8. ^{^} Garang said (www.splmtoday.com)
9. ^{^} taking the towns to the people (www.splmtoday.com)
10. ^{^} squandered (www.theguardian.com)
11. ^{^} A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts (www.guardianbookshop.co.uk)