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Force Reduction Key to South Sudan's Military Transformation - World Politics Review

South Sudan has embarked on a program to transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the country’s preindependence guerrilla army, into a professional, conventional force by 2017. However, the success of this transformation strategy, referred to as Objective Force 2017, is contingent on a number of factors, including the absence of major conflict with Sudan, South Sudan’s ability to recover from the impact of this year’s austerity budget and the military’s ability to undertake a significant reduction in force.

The precise size of the SPLA is not known, but is estimated to be as high as 210,000 soldiers. As Objective Force 2017 establishes the need for the SPLA to have a parade of 120,000, as many as 90,000 soldiers will need to be demobilized in the years to come.

A handful of initiatives, some already established and others in the planning stages, are intended to facilitate efforts to rightsize the SPLA. Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the war with Sudan was signed in 2005, some of the SPLA’s surplus manpower has already been channeled toward other organized services, such as police, prisons, fire and wildlife.

Another mechanism that has been used is the Wounded Heroes program, established by the government in 2008 following protests by disabled veterans in response to the nonpayment of SPLA salaries. This program is now being fine-tuned so that it does not become a dumping ground for uninjured personnel deemed nonessential to the military. The government is also considering establishing a pension program to gradually age out older soldiers, but this is being held up due to concerns over affordability.

Ultimately, however, the majority of the SPLA’s surplus manpower will have to go through a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, Phase II of which is now underway. A prerequisite for the transformation of the SPLA, DDR is intended to run parallel to and be closely coordinated with the execution of Objective Force 2017.

As originally mandated by the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements (.pdf), the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces were each to send 90,000 soldiers through the DDR process. However, DDR in South Sudan was derailed by the perception that the CPA was more a cease-fire than a peace agreement, which made the SPLA reluctant to reduce its manpower.

In addition, the SPLA was resistant to the DDR process due to concerns that demobilized soldiers would not receive a level of support necessary to neutralize their potential to cause future instability. Amid South Sudan’s fragile postwar economic situation, there was a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated into poverty, and that the government and donor community had not effectively managed ex-combatants’ expectations regarding civilian life as an alternative to the SPLA.

Consequently, the first phase of DDR was largely regarded as a failure (.pdf). Only 12,525 people entered the program in South Sudan, and most were special needs groups that consisted of the elderly, the disabled and women and children associated with the armed forces.

Despite the lip service paid to downsizing, the SPLA has, in fact, been growing since the war ended. The 2006 Juba Declaration and President Salva Kiir’s subsequent amnesties for armed groups that have rebelled against the Government of South Sudan since then have often resulted in the integration of these groups into the SPLA. Referred to as Kiir’s “big tent” policy, amnesty and integration is a form of patronage intended to demonstrate the nascent state’s inclusivity, as well as prevent potentially destabilizing insurrections. But it has also resulted in adding to the SPLA’s numbers.

The SPLA’s growth can also be attributed to the lack of a centralized personnel management system to track the recruitment process. As a pre-emptive measure, SPLA recruitment drives have targeted at-risk male youths (.pdf) who might otherwise become involved in the cycle of communal violence that has afflicted Jonglei state. In addition, during the low-intensity conflict along the border with Sudan earlier this year, the SPLA mounted a recruitment campaign in case the conflict escalated.

Despite the imperative to reduce the size of the SPLA, the same issues that derailed the SPLA’s initial efforts to downsize and continue to fuel its growth persist. Peace between the two Sudans remains fragile. South Sudan’s economy lacks the capacity to absorb tens of thousands of demobilized soldiers. And due to the failure of DDR Phase I, the donor community is skeptical of the prospects for the success of Phase II and is consequently reluctant to support it. One area of progress is that the military may be coming around to DDR, which, along with other demobilization programs, will be critical for the success of Objective Force 2017.

As up to 40 percent of the SPLA’s budget is spent on personnel salaries, a reduction in force would reduce the burden of ineffective personnel, such as soldiers who are too old to fight or not physically fit. This could allow for the reallocation of resources toward the professionalization of a core group of soldiers, and toward the improvement of the SPLA’s operational capabilities -- including protecting its border with Sudan, establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within the borders of South Sudan and protecting civilians from communal violence.

Most importantly, for the broader population of South Sudan, a reduction in force could allow for a reduction in the SPLA’s budget so that resources could be allocated toward building the capacity of civilian institutions and improving the government’s capacity to delivery services.

Lesley Anne Warner is an Africa analyst at CNA's Center for Strategic Studies and is currently on assignment at the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University. The content of this article is based on the author’s fieldwork in South Sudan in August and September 2012. The views expressed here are her own and do not reflect the views of any organization with which she is affiliated.

Photo: Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit (photo by wikimedia user Jenny Rockett, licensed under the Creative Commons ShareAlike 2.0 Unported Agreement).

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