China's strategic inroads in African Sahel region

 

Africa's Sahel region comprises Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Senegal. Regular droughts and a surge in conflict over depleted resources like water and pasture are its defining traits. The growth of transnational criminal organizations and quick ascent of Islamist extremist groups have further added fuel to the conflict. As terrorist groups have plagued sub-Saharan nations, this has not only unseated, mostly Western-modeled democracies but also revealed a vast area for engagement in the Sahel's security.

For the past nine years, France has served as primary security provider in the conflict-ridden Sahel region but recently, France has been faced with an increase in public animosity in the region. In the wake of violent protests from civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso as well as in Niger, France decided to withdraw its final unit from Mali in August 2022. Following France’s decision, other European nations supplying security to the region, such as Norway, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Lithuania are also likely to follow suit. The US too, as part of its trans-Sahara counterterrorism policy tool, has offered modest security assistance to these countries in an effort to assist them in addressing their domestic terrorist threats. Now, the Sahel's rapidly deteriorating security situation, caused by the US and France's dwindling presence there, has made room for new players in the security industry, most notably China^[2] and Russia.

Many nations in the Sahel region are now looking towards China as a serious alternative to the Western-dominated international system. During the Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Dakar (Senegal) on November 29-30, 2021, Senegalese Foreign Minister Assata Tall Sail encouraged China to participate in the Sahel conflict settlement process. Traditionally, China has resisted calls for intervention and has participated in non-combatant peace operations only e.g. in 1998, PLA formally initiated training for civilian police in peacekeeping operations.^[3][4][5]

However, things began to change in 2012 when its first combat-ready peacekeepers participated in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In 2013, China sent a sizable detachment of personnel, including combat forces to Mali and also supported the UN mission there with ground combat troops. The recent appointment of their first special ambassador to the Horn of Africa suggests a shift in China's approach to its African policy.

China is also actively supporting the G5 Sahel security and counterterrorism operations, working with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. In 2019, China provided aid worth $45.56 million to the security and counterterrorism operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Additionally, China paid $1.5 million for the operations of the G5 permanent secretariat. Thus, within a span of a decade, China occupies a predominant space in the security of the region.

Beijing’s involvement in the security of the Sahel has primarily coincided with its expanding commercial interests in the region. A significant mineral resource hotspot, the Sahel is abundant in bauxite, manganese, phosphates, iron ore, gold, as well as petroleum. Besides, the region has substantial levels of uranium. Beijing's approach to security in the Sahel is motivated by the need to protect its commercial endeavors, economic statecraft, and expanding number of Chinese workers in the area.

During the last few years, China has been able to gain significant foothold in the Sahel region. In Chad, the China National Petroleum Company controls the country's oil production since 2003. In Niger, China has made significant investments in the oil industry. In 2021, China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering Co. Ltd. (CPPJ) started the construction of a 1950 km long, 20 inch-diameter transnational crude oil pipeline. Taking advantage of the vast uranium reserves (about 7% of the world’s total exploitable reserves), Beijing has also begun several uranium extraction-related infrastructure projects in Niger e.g. the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the government of Niger, by a joint partnership called Somina, run the Azelik mine. As part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) inked in 2021, China provided Mali with more than $9 million worth of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, trucks, transport equipment and security. Same year China's Ganfeng Lithium Co bought 50 per cent stakes of the Goulamina mine for $130 million reflecting its ambition to ensure the supply of a critical commodity essential for manufacturing electric-vehicle batteries. Besides, China was also awarded two significant railway project contracts worth over $11 billion by Mali.

In Mauritania, China is becoming increasingly interested in fish, mineral, and energy resources. The Poly Hong Dong Fishery Company^[8], accused of depleting local fish populations, has a $200 million fishing facility in Nouadhibou. In 2018, Burkina Faso rescinded the recognition of Taiwan. This act was duly rewarded by China during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the country in 2019 when he had pledged $44 million. Besides, Beijing also announced72 scholarships for Burkinabe students and government representatives to attend military academies in China.

Beijing, through its investments, pursues a policy of gradually laying down the debt trap which eventually targets and turns financially weak countries dependent on China. The lending terms are designed not just to maximize pure commercial interests, but also to protect the politico-strategic objectives of the Chinese state.

^[1][6][7]

References

1. ^{^} Sahel (www.bing.com)
2. ^{^} China (www.bing.com)
3. ^{^} FOCAC (www.bing.com)
4. ^{^} Sail (www.bing.com)
5. ^{^} PLA (www.bing.com)
6. ^{^} UN Mission in South Sudan (www.bing.com)
7. ^{^} Ganfeng Lithium Co (www.bing.com)
8. ^{^} Poly Hong Dong Fishery Company (www.bing.com)