South Sudan's power-sharing deal and a battle of elites

But many South Sudanese think the political elite remain more interested in seeking government posts and personal advantage than sustainable peace and are doubtful if this latest elite deal will make much difference.

This caution appears to be shared by the Troika of the US, UK and Norway, who were excluded from the final negotiations and declined to co-sign the agreement.

Having seen the 2015 peace deal swiftly fall apart and multiple violations of ceasefire agreements since the conflict started in December 2013, they want to see evidence of the parties’ commitment to accountable implementation of this latest deal, including a new determination to put the needs of the people first.

There are plenty of reasons to be sceptical. Two months after the signing of this latest deal, fighting has continued in several areas, humanitarian workers have been attacked, political detainees remain in jail^[1] and independent websites are still blocked.

Further, Kiir and Machar proved unable to work together in the last transitional government. Systemic corruption, nepotism and tribal patronage remain prevalent at all levels of government. The latest deal provides for a bloated governance structure, with five vice-presidents. The country faces economic crisis. And there is a lack of clarity over how all this will work in practice.

Some in the opposition are also concerned that the deal provides for a more intrusive role for Sudan and Uganda, including militarily, and appears designed to serve their interests.

Sudan has already deployed troops to protect the oil fields in Unity State. When the venue for the peace process moved from Addis Ababa to the Sudanese capital of Khartoum in June, presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda used their leverage on Machar and Kiir respectively to broker a deal.

But the government of Sudan made no secret of its desire to benefit from South Sudan’s oil resources to contain its own economic crisis. At a time when Sudan wants to normalise its relations with the international community, it is also keen to project itself in the role of regional peace-maker.

However, there are also tentative reasons for hope. There is no appetite among the South Sudanese population to prolong a war that is widely understood to be driven by a power struggle between self-interested political elites.

Despite pockets of serious fighting, the overall level of violence has significantly declined compared to this time last year.

Several opposition parties therefore concluded that, despite reservations, they had no option but to back the deal.

Several of their leaders have returned to Juba and held consultations with Kiir. Even Machar made a one-day trip to Juba on Bashir’s plane to take part in the peace celebrations, the first time he had been back since he was driven out in July 2016.

Regional dynamics look more favourable to peace than in 2015. Because of their own economic problems, Sudan and Uganda now have an incentive to support the peace deal.

The power balance between key South Sudanese players has also shifted. Kiir signed the 2015 peace agreement reluctantly and with many reservations, but has welcomed the new deal because the region seems to have accepted that he should remain in office as president for the foreseeable future. He is in a militarily more dominant position than in 2015 and is reassured that, this time, Machar will not be returning to Juba with his own army.

From Machar’s perspective, the deal is also attractive because it has meant release from two years under house arrest in South Africa and restored him to the post of first vice-president.

Much remains to be accomplished before the transition is even launched. Security sector reform, financial transparency and reaching consensus on a federal structure are bound to prove difficult and contentious.

The Troika and the EU can play a key role, beyond any financing of the transition, notably by encouraging trust-building between political leaders – particularly Kiir and Machar – even before the launch of the new government.

Dame Rosalind Marsden was the EU Special Representative for Sudan from September 2010 until October 2013. She is an Associate Fellow of the Africa Programme, Chatham House

References

1. ^{^} jail (www.bing.com)