Articles

Malakal – two viewpoints

John Ashworth

19^th January 2009

Introduction

 

There is general agreement on what happened. As traditional dancers prepared to enter Malakal stadium in procession on the occasion of the 4^th anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9^th January 2009, a dispute broke out between two communities.

 

Sticks and spears were wielded, shots were fired by the police, tear gas was deployed, there were deaths and injuries, the arrival of the president and first vice-president was delayed while the security situation was assessed, and the national ceremony finally went ahead but with a subdued atmosphere.

 

There is also little disagreement that the following day, 10^th January, the village of Anakdiar (Nagdiar) was attacked. Several people were killed and homes and property were destroyed. There are also reports of other similar incidents nearby. People have been displaced from their homes, possibly in their thousands.

 

And finally, there is acknowledgement that different ethnic groups claim the same land in the area of Malakal and that the boundaries need to be either reaffirmed or readjusted.

 

But from that point on, there are many differing viewpoints. Were these spontaneous events, or part of a planned and orchestrated campaign? Are they the result of local disputes, or part of a bigger picture? Is tribalism rearing its ugly head in Malakal, and indeed in the south as a whole? Who, if anybody, was behind them? And why?

 

These are the questions one can hear being discussed all over Malakal. Many people have strong opinions, certainty even, which could lead to hasty actions. Some are ready to take up arms and fight now. Below are two composite views.

 

Viewpoint number 1

 

A dispute over who is to lead the procession of dancers is not a trivial matter. Local custom requires that the owners of the land lead. Thus for the Collo (Shilluk) to give way to Dinka dancers would imply acceptance that the Dinka own the town of Malakal.

 

The Collo acknowledge that the Dinka have laid claim to parts of the east bank inhabited by Collo. However they feel that the matter was settled in their favour by the government of the then autonomous south in the 1970s, and again when the matter was brought to the attention of Dr John Garang in 2004.

 

There was some surprise that an event of such national importance should be the vehicle for reaffirming these claims, but the attacks on Anakdiar and other villages immediately afterwards led many to surmise that it was a planned and orchestrated campaign. Leaflets and letters had been circulating for some months. A warning of the attack on Anakdiar was apparently received the day before, again leading to suspicions that it was planned.

 

There is considerable disappointment with the inaction of the government of Upper Nile State. A resolution passed at a conference held by the Southern Sudan Peace Commission a year earlier in January 2008 that border issues must be resolved has not been implemented. No action was taken to defuse the situation in advance, following the leaflets and letters which had been circulating. No action was taken after the warning about an attack on Anakdiar. The governor is not being seen to take a strong lead on resolving the issue after the event. Further confusion was sown when a government delegation was apparently detained and harassed by security forces whilst attempting to visit the affected areas on 15^th January.

 

Some of those who believe that this was part of a premeditated campaign would go further and suggest that it is orchestrated by figures within the Dinka community outside of Malakal. Some would even link it to a perceived Dinka domination of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), suggesting that local Dinka communities may have seen their chance to lay claim to Collo land confident that they will enjoy the support of their brothers in high places, whether in Malakal or Juba. There are even suspicions that Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces may have participated in the attacks. In this scenario, it is noted that most of the senior officials in Malakal, including the Commissioner of Malakal County, are Dinka. Although Governor Gatluak Deng is Nuer, his ancestry is Dinka and, as the only National Congress Party (NCP) governor in the south, it is assumed that he may not wish to further alienate senior figures in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Those who espouse this view would also link it to wider dissatisfaction with SPLM and GOSS, particularly from certain ethnic groups who feel disenfranchised by the Dinka (which might include the governor’s Nuer). A statement by some Bari politicians in Khartoum is being circulated along with a letter by Collo members of the various legislative assemblies, in which this group of Bari openly complain of tribalism and come close to repudiating the CPA “if it is being used for isolating and excluding the Bari Community from power and wealth”.

 

This then leads to a very worrying scenario where southerners are once again divided, even to the extent of questioning the value of the CPA. As one Collo leader put it, “Peace is supposed to mean no killing!” While nobody has suggested that northern interests are behind the current unrest in Malakal, the NCP has in the past demonstrated a great ability to “divide and rule” in the south, and this would surely present them with another ideal opportunity. If the two communities were to seek arms to continue their dispute violently, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that one would turn to the north and one to the south.

 

Viewpoint number 2

 

Others would acknowledge that the fracas outside the stadium was unfortunate, but would play down its significance. They would argue that there is no orchestrated campaign, but that when news of the incident reached the Dinka around Anakdiar, it acted as a catalyst to simmering local resentments not only over land but over other unresolved local issues. There is no widespread movement by the Dinka to attack the Collo. Indeed around Atar and Melut local Dinka met with the Collo community to reassure them that there was no danger.

 

Nevertheless, there is a land issue. For many Dinka it is clear that the west bank of the Nile is Collo and the east bank is Dinka. Over many generations that has become blurred, through intermarriage, through local agreements and migrations, and because the Dinka tend to spend more time inland while the Collo are very much people of the riverbank. Using and sharing the land is not a problem; claiming ownership of it is. At the same time ongoing uncertainty about the north-south border demarcation may be a contributory factor amidst fears that southern communities may lose land to the north. Local Dinka leaders are as keen as Collo to have the boundary issues resolved officially.

 

This viewpoint accepts that outside influences are at play here, including politicians and former militia leaders. When the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was facilitating the People to People Peace and Reconciliation Process in the liberated territories during the war, a point was reached when the Nuer and Dinka elders came together and said, “We have now made peace. There is no problem between our peoples. The problem lies with our sons, the military and political leaders”. NSCC responded by convening the Kisumu meeting in which chiefs and elders met with political leaders from the liberation movements. Maybe there are echoes of this in today’s situation in Malakal. Two ethnic groups which have lived closely together and shared so much may nonetheless have issues ripe for exploitation by politicians seeking to advance their own positions.

 

But machinations by politicians may be relatively local and do not necessarily imply that there is tribal domination of the entire south by one ethnic group. In fact around Khorfulus there are disputes between different groups of Dinka, which can also reportedly be linked to politicians. Some would also point out the power struggles within the Collo community, and would even go so far as to suggest that the current conflict might be to the advantage of one party or the other in their attempts to gain influence, and particularly in terms of improving their standing vis a vis the Collo Reth (king).

 

There is again disappointment that the government of Upper Nile State has not been more proactive, and particularly that it has not made use of traditional chiefs and elders to try to resolve the issues.

 

Conclusion and recommendations

 

There are always two (or more) sides to any story. As mentioned above, these are composite viewpoints, gleaned from discussions with members of the different communities. The final analysis is mine, but I would like to think it is based upon reality. Here in Malakal the strong feelings are very evident, but so also are the complexity and the fact that the current conflict is based in a cultural, historical and political context. Complex problems do not succumb to simple nor “quick fix” solutions.

 

There are a number of recommendations which would seem to be acceptable to all viewpoints – at least to all those whose agendas have been stated openly:

 

1. Peace is better than violence; the situation must be calmed down immediately to allow solutions to be found.

2. The land and boundary demarcation issues between Collo and Dinka in and around Malakal should be resolved urgently by the competent authorities.

3. The government of Upper Nile State must be proactive and even-handed in ensuring the security of all its citizens and in resolving their disputes.

4. Traditional leaders have a major role to play both in calming the immediate situation and resolving the underlying problems. They must be encouraged to play a leading role to counterbalance politicians from various communities who may have other agendas.

5. Churches also have a major role to play as honest brokers and builders of peace, particularly the Catholic and Episcopal churches which are very active in the two communities.

6. Southerners must not leave themselves vulnerable to a “divide and rule” strategy by those northern interests which may wish to undermine the CPA. Even if all disputes cannot be solved, southern unity is important at least until post-2011.

 

Finally, this problem exploits a perception amongst some communities in the south of tribalism in the SPLM and GOSS. Whether that perception is true or not depends on one’s viewpoint. However a perception can be as dangerous as a reality, and indeed can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 

One key informant asked me rhetorically, “Will we reach 2011?” If the south is to reach 2011 successfully, if the fragile CPA is to be maintained and implemented until then, and if “divide and rule” tactics are to be avoided, then this perception of tribalism needs to be addressed – urgently.